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the purpose of avoiding escalation. But
ultimately, no government intervenes
for the sake of keeping a conflict limited;
regardless of that goal, its actions will
be determined most by the political
objective it seeks to achieve. The author’s
theory sheds light on one aspect of the
actors’ motives in cases in which the
desire to avoid escalation is relatively
strong. But, as in the case of any such
theory, understanding such situations
requires a full assessment of the goals
and circumstances of each of the actors.
ABRAM N. SHULSKY

China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, ed. Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019. 352
pages. $50.

In its long history, China has deployed
substantial naval power, but only
episodically. It never faced sustained
naval threats, so the country’s maritime
frontier was not a perennial strategic
concern. But in more modern times,
seaborne pressures from the Western
powers and Japan became unremitting.
Foreign navies even sailed deep into the
country’s interior, establishing “treaty
ports” hundreds of miles from the coast.
This ended with the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949. Still,
even though Western naval power was
pushed offshore, seaborne forces nearby
could attack China with impunity.
This rankled, but what to do? In 1965,
Marshal Lin Biao (perhaps Chairman
Mao’s closest comrade in arms) looked
to the earlier defeat of Japan by the
once-tiny People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) to ask, “How was it possible for a
weak country finally to defeat a strong
country?” His answer was found in
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Mao Zedong’s idea of “People’s War.”
Although land based, the concept held
promise for menacing forward naval
positions of the United States, perceived
as the foremost opponent. Having
backed an insurgency in the Philippines,
a coup attempt in Indonesia, and guerilla
wars in Malaya and Vietnam, Beijing
could imagine pushing the United
States out of great anchorages such as
Subic, Cam Rahn, and Singapore. As
for Yokosuka, Japan—the U.S. Navy’s
most important base in the western
Pacific—a successful political campaign
might chase the United States four
thousand miles east, back to Honolulu.
This was naval warfare de facto, but
it did not succeed. In the end, China
learned that American sea power
could not be neutralized on the cheap.
However, China began to rise
economically through its seaborne
connections, and in the 1980s Admiral
Liu Huaqing—sometimes called “China’s
Mahan”—made a case for a strong navy.
This vision was realized more fully in
2012 when Communist Party leader Hu
Jintao announced a new national goal:
“to enhance our capacity for exploiting
marine resources, develop the marine
economy, protect the marine maritime
rights and interests, and build China
into a strong maritime power.”
During this same period of an economically rising China, the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute
became a leading center for analyzing
China’s naval power. Two of the Institute’s mainstays, Andrew Erickson and
Ryan Martinson, again have contributed
to our understanding by assembling and
editing twenty papers prepared for a
2017 conference on what could turn out
to be the most significant component
of China’s modus operandi at sea:
exploitation of the so-called gray zone.
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This anthology reminds us that the naval
battle with China already is underway,
and that it is about more than big ships,
aircraft, and submarines. The PLA
Navy, which certainly likes to show
off its new fleet, also relies on a coast
guard, fishing boats, and maritime
militia, which are perfectly suited for
a gray-zone space of neither war nor
peace. As a result, China has succeeded
in enclosing and then militarizing areas
once thought of as high seas. China,
in best Leninist fashion, continues to
probe and push, encountering “mush”
instead of the steel of real resistance.
This is certainly not “decisive naval
battle–ism,” nor is it quite “people’s war
at sea.” Still, Mao’s dicta echo: a struggle
is 10 percent military / 90 percent
political; avoid the decisive encounter
until the very last moment; and, above
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all, protract, to enable one to build from
weakness to strength. Soon after becoming a Communist Party leader in 2013,
Xi Jinping told his comrades in a private
speech that China would remain weaker
than the West for some time. China’s
naval operations in the maritime gray
zone—patient, purposeful, relentless—
embody Maoist patience, buying
time to maneuver from a position of
relative weakness to one of strength.
The papers collected in this new work,
China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,
can help us better understand this
maneuvering and meet the challenges
the West already faces—challenges
that only will grow as China’s naval
strength and presence grow.
CHARLES HORNER
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